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Note
Adding Insult to Injury: ERISA, Knudson, and the
Error of the Possession Theory
David D. Leishman*
Until relatively recently, insurers did not demand that injured policyholders repay the medical expenses they received
from their insurance plans.' Today, however, insurers commonly do make such a demand, usually supported by language
in the policy requiring reimbursement. 2 A majority of states, by
statute or common law, prevent insurers from enforcing such
clauses. 3 If the insurance plan falls under the aegis of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA),4 however, the plan 5 will often recover because ERISA preempts
state law that would prevent reimbursement. 6 The distinction
* J.D. Candidate 2006, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A. 1996,
Wheaton College. The author thanks Andrew Neuharth, Ryan Stai, and the
staff and board of the Minnesota Law Review for their assistance. Special
thanks to Dena, Kaelin, and Homer Leishman for their unbounded patience.
1. See infra notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
2. See infra notes 15-16 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 17-19 and accompanying text.
4. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (2000). Under ERISA, an "employee benefit plan"
is:
any plan, fund, or program which was heretofore or is hereafter established or maintained by an employer or by an employee organization,
or by both, to the extent that such plan, fund, or program was established or is maintained for the purpose of providing for its participants or their beneficiaries, through the purchase of insurance or otherwise ....

medical, surgical, or hospital care or benefits, or benefits

in the event of sickness, accident, disability, death or unemployment ....

Id.
5. Reimbursement actions may be brought by both an ERISA plan (the
entity that administers the payment of medical benefits), see, e.g., Mid Atlantic Medical Services, Inc. v. Sereboff, 303 F. Supp. 2d 691, 695 (D. Md. 2004),
or its insurer (which agrees to pay some or all of the medical expenses on behalf of the plan), see, e.g., Great-West Life & Annuity Insurance Co. v.
Knudson, 534 U.S. 204 (2002). The distinction is beyond the scope of, and
largely immaterial to, this Note.
6. See infra Part I.B.
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is significant: almost all health insurance but Medicare is pro7
vided through employer plans and thus subject to ERISA.
In Great-West Life & Annuity Insurance Co. v. Knudson,
the Supreme Court limited actions by ERISA plans to those
typically available at equity, and held that an insurer cannot
obtain reimbursement when the policyholder does not possess
an identifiable fund of money directly traceable to the thirdparty recovery.8 Since Knudson, most federal courts have
adopted an erroneous doctrine known as "the possession theory," which observes the obvious corollary to Knudson's holding: an ERISA plan can obtain reimbursement when the policyholder does possess an identifiable, traceable fund.9 The
Sixth and Ninth Circuits, however, have declined to follow the
possession theory and generally refuse to allow reimbursement
actions by ERISA insurers against policyholders.1 0
This Note sketches the traditional state law presumption
against subrogation or reimbursement by an insurer in personal injury cases. It then describes how ERISA trumps these
state laws, and how Knudson has led most federal courts to allow plans to pursue causes of action "traditionally available at
equity" against policyholders. This Note argues that reimbursement under the possession theory does not meet the requirements set forth in Knudson, and concludes that there is no
currently viable cause of action for an ERISA plan seeking reimbursement from a policyholder. It also describes the reasoning of the two circuits that refuse to follow the possession theory and concludes that their analyses are incomplete.
I. DEVELOPMENT OF CURRENT FEDERAL COMMON
LAW CONCERNING REIMBURSEMENT ACTIONS BY
ERISA PLANS
A. SUBROGATION OF PERSONAL INJURY CLAIMS HAS BEEN
HISTORICALLY DISFAVORED

Subrogation is a principle whereby an insurer who has indemnified a policyholder may assume legal standing in place of

7. Lorraine Schmall & Brenda Stephens, ERISA Preemption: A Move
Towards Defederalizing Claims for Patients' Rights, 42 BRANDEIs L.J. 529,
538 (2004).
8. 534 U.S. 204 (2002).

9. See infra Part I.C.2.
10. See infra Part IV.
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the policyholder to sue a third-party tortfeasor on the policyholder's claim for compensation.'1 Closely related to, but distinct from, subrogation is reimbursement, in which the insurer
asserts a contractual right to repayment from the policyholder
12
should she later recover from a third party.
Courts historically did not allow subrogation of personal injury claims 13 due to the common law prohibitions against assignment of personal injury claims and against splitting personal injury causes of action. 14 In the 1960s, however, insurers
found that couching subrogation clauses in language of "reimbursement" avoided the rule against subrogation while achieving the same result. 15 Thus, the concept of subrogation and/or
reimbursement of personal injury claims "is of relatively recent
origin, having only been developed in the last thirty to forty
years."16
A minority of states have flatly rejected, either by court decision or statute, the extension of subrogation actions into the
realm of personal injury claims. 17 More commonly, state "makewhole" doctrines reduce an insurer's ability to recover from a

11. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1467 (8th ed. 2004); Roger M. Baron, Subrogation:A Pandora'sBox Awaiting Closure, 41 S.D. L. REV. 237, 238 (1996).
12. See Michelle J. d'Arcambal, The Assault on Subrogation, in ALI-ABA
CONFERENCE ON LIFE INSURANCE LITIGATION 461, 463 (ALI-ABA eds. 1997)
(defining subrogation and reimbursement).
13. See Baron, supra note 11, at 239-40 (noting that "subrogation had
been disallowed by virtually all courts until recently").
14. ROBERT E. KEETON, BASIC TEXT ON INSURANCE LAW 152-53 (1971).
15. Id. As insurers sought ways around the common law prohibition of
subrogation of personal injury claims, they discovered that courts were often
more amenable to language of "reimbursement" than of "subrogation." Roger
M. Baron, Public Policy ConsiderationsWarranting Denial of Reimbursement
to ERISA Plans: It's Time to Recognize the Elephant in the Courtroom, 55
MERCER L. REV. 595, 603 (2004). For a case illustrating the erosion of the distinction between subrogation and reimbursement, see Lee v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 129 Cal. Rptr. 271 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976). The
policy language exalted form over substance by requiring "reimbursement,"
but also required the policyholder, upon the insurer's request, to sue a third
party to facilitate the insurer's reimbursement right. Id. at 274. In this manner, "the disingenuous draftsmen of insurance policies move[d] into the gaps
created by decisional erosion ....
The cumulative effect of the policy provisions is to create the economic reality of subrogation to the personal injury
claim without its language." Id. at 278 (Freidman, J., concurring).
16. Baron, supra note 15, at 602-03.
17. Roger M. Baron, Subrogationon Medical Expense Claims: The "Double
Recovery" Myth and the Feasibility of State Anti-Subrogation Laws, 96 DICK.
L. REV. 581, 584-85 (1992) (noting that Missouri, Arizona, Connecticut, Nevada, Montana, Pennsylvania, and Oklahoma adopt this minority view).
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policyholder by requiring that the policyholder first be fully
compensated for any uninsured loss. 1 8 Twenty-five jurisdictions
19
The majority of
have adopted the make-whole doctrine.
states, therefore, at least agree that an insurer is not entitled
to share in a policyholder's recovery from a tortfeasor until the
policyholder has been fully compensated for her loss.

B. ERISA PREEMPTS STATE LAWS PROHIBITING SUBROGATION
AND REIMBURSEMENT

Congress drafted ERISA in response to the failure of a
number of employer-sponsored benefit plans. It was intended to
guarantee the solvency of such plans, thus guaranteeing benefits to workers. 20 During drafting, ERISA came to encompass
not only pension plans, but also medical and other employee
exbenefit plans. 21 Congress, unfortunately, "gave very little
22
plicit consideration to the implications of this expansion."
To protect workers by guaranteeing the solvency of their
benefit plans, and to encourage employers to offer benefit plans
to their employees, Congress created nationwide standards for
the administration of benefit plans, hoping to reduce the ad-

18. Greta E. Cowart, Subrogation After Great-West Life & Annuity Ins.
Co. v. Knudson, in PENSION, PROFIT-SHARING, WELFARE, AND OTHER
COMPENSATION PLANS 661, 670 (ALI-ABA eds. 2002).
19. Elaine M. Rinaldi, Apportionment of Recovery Between Insured and
Insurer in a Subrogation Case, 29 TORT & INS. L.J. 803, 807 (1994) (reporting
that Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, Indiana,
Iowa, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi,
Montana, New Jersey, North Carolina, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Texas, Utah,
Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin have adopted the doctrine).
20. Russell Korobkin, The Failed Jurisprudenceof Managed Care, and
How To Fix It: Reinterpreting ERISA Preemption, 51 UCLA L. REV. 457, 464
(2003) (citing H.R. REP. NO. 93-533, at 1 (1973), reprinted in 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4639) ('The primary purpose of the statute was to regulate
private-sector pension plans at the federal level and thus guarantee the solvency and integrity of such plans for the benefit of employees."). See generally
James A. Wooten, "The Most Glorious Story of Failure in the Business'" The
Studebaker-PackardCorporationand the Origins of ERISA, 49 BUFF. L. REV.
683 (2001) (describing how the 1963 shutdown of the Studebaker plant in
South Bend, Indiana and its ensuing failure to meet pension obligations to its
employees was a catalyzing event in the drafting of ERISA).
21. Korobkin, supra note 20, at 465 ("In the drafting process, however, the
scope of ERISA was expanded to provide federal oversight of all employersponsored fringe benefit plans, including plans that provide for the medical
care of employees.").
22. Id.
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ministrative cost of compliance with various state regulations. 23
To further this standardization, Congress endowed ERISA with
"the most comprehensive and pervasive preemption of the present era."24 The precise machinations of ERISA preemption
continue to perplex federal courts, including the Supreme
Court;25 nonetheless, certain general principles are clear.
ERISA preemption is governed by three clauses: the pre28
emption clause, 26 the saving clause,2 7 and the deemer clause.
23. N.Y. Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins.
Co., 514 U.S. 645, 646 (1995). Congress implemented nationwide standardization as a means, not an end; Congress was ultimately driven by "the absolute
need that safeguards for plan participants be sufficiently adequate and effective to prevent the numerous inequities to workers under plans which have
resulted in tragic hardship to so many." H.R. REP. No. 93-533, at 9 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4647.
24. Bauhaus USA, Inc. v. Copeland, 292 F.3d 439, 445 (5th Cir. 2002)
(Wiener, J., dissenting).
25. See DiFelice v. Aetna U.S. Healthcare, 346 F.3d 442, 454 (3rd Cir.
2003) (Becker, J., concurring) (resolving ERISA preemption claims in the
healthcare context is like a "descent into a Serbonian bog wherein judges are
forced to don logical blinders and split the linguistic atom to decide even the
most routine cases"); Dishman v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., 269 F.3d 974,
980 (9th Cir. 2001) (noting that defining a rule for preemption "has bedeviled
the Supreme Court"); Carpenters Local Union No. 26 v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co.,
215 F.3d 136, 139 (1st Cir. 2000) (noting that the Supreme Court has "been at
least mildly schizophrenic in mapping" the contours of ERISA preemption);
Travelers Ins. Co. v. Cuomo, 14 F.3d 708, 717 (2d Cir. 1993) ("With understated irony, the Supreme Court has described the ERISA section at issue
here as 'not a model of legislative drafting.' In truth, it is a veritable Sargasso
Sea of obfuscation."); Atlantis Health Plan v. Local 713, I.B.O.T.U., 258 F.
Supp. 2d 284, 289 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) ("Deciphering the mysteries surrounding
the circumstances under which ERISA works to supersede a conflicting state
statute or common law claim has become a task demanding nothing less than
oracular power."); Florence Nightingale Nursing Serv., Inc. v. Blue Cross &
Blue Shield of Ala., 832 F. Supp. 1456, 1457 (N.D. Ala. 1993) ("A hyperbolic
wag is reputed to have said that E.R.I.S.A. stands for 'Everything Ridiculous
Invented Since Adam.' This court does not take so dim a view of [ERISA]. Instead, this court is willing to believe that ERISA has lurking somewhere
within it a redeeming feature."), aff'd, 41 F.3d 1476 (11th Cir. 1995).
26. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2000) ("Except as provided in [the saving clause],
the provisions of this subchapter... shall supersede any and all State laws
insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan [covered by ERISA].").
27. Id. § 1144(b)(2)(A) ("Except as provided in [the deemer clause], nothing in this subchapter shall be construed to exempt or relieve any person from
any law of any State which regulates insurance, banking, or securities.").
28. Id. § 1144(b)(2)(B) (providing that certain employee benefit plans may
not be "deemed to be an insurance company" within the meaning of the saving
clause). For purposes of this Note, a cursory sketch of ERISA preemption will
suffice; the reader should be aware that this sketch is a gross oversimplification of this tortuous body of law.
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Generally speaking, the preemption clause provides broad
prima facie preemption of any state law relating to an ERISA
plan. 29 The saving clause "saves" from preemption state regulations directed at insurance, banking, and securities, thus preventing ERISA from swallowing those areas of state law in
their entirety. 30 Finally, the deemer clause provides that selfinsured ERISA plans (those that pay claims themselves rather
than contracting with an insurer to do so) shall not be "deemed"
insurers under state law, thus preventing states from passing
plans and makinsurance legislation narrowly aimed at ERISA
31
preemption.
ERISA
around
end-run
an
ing
ERISA's preemption clause provides that the Act's provisions "supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may
now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan" covered
by ERISA. 32 The Supreme Court has given the "relate to"
33
phrase its "broad common-sense meaning." A state law relates
to an employee benefit plan, "in the normal sense of the phrase,
34
if it has a connection with or reference to such a plan." The
Supreme Court has recognized that "ERISA's nearly limitless
'relates to' language offers no meaningful guidelines to reviewing judges," 35 and that courts "'simply must go beyond the unhelpful text and the frustrating difficulty of defining its key
term, and look instead to the objectives of the ERISA statute as

29. See infra notes 32-36 and accompanying text.
30. JAMES F. JORDAN ET AL., HANDBOOK ON ERISA LITIGATION § 2.04 (2d
ed. 2004).
31. Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 45 (1987).
32. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a).
33. Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 47.
34. Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 96-97 (1983). For purposes
of ERISA preemption, "state law" includes both statutory and common law. 29
U.S.C. § 1144(c)(1); Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 48 (1987). A state law that expressly
refers to an ERISA plan will unquestionably "relate to" an employee benefit
plan for purposes of the preemption clause. District of Columbia v. Greater
Wash. Bd. of Trade, 506 U.S. 125, 137 (1992) ("State laws that directly regulate ERISA plans, or that make it necessary for plan administrators to operate
such plans differently, 'relate to' such plans in the sense intended by Congress."). However, "the preemption clause is not limited to state laws specifically designed to affect employee benefit plans." Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 47-48.
35. Gerosa v. Savasta & Co., 329 F.3d 317, 323 (2d Cir. 2003) (citing Rush
Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 365-66 (2002), cert. denied, 540
U.S. 967 (2003), and cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1074 (2003); N.Y. State Conference
of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 655-56
(1995)).
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a guide to the scope of the state law that Congress understood
would survive."' 36
C. CURRENT FEDERAL COMMON LAW ALLOWS ERISA PLANS To
PURSUE REIMBURSEMENT
ERISA's text is silent on subrogation and reimbursement, 37
so federal common law determines the application of state antisubrogation laws and make-whole doctrines to actions by
ERISA plans. The Supreme Court's decision in FMC Corp. v.
Holliday38 forms the current framework for ERISA preemption
of state antisubrogation statutes. In that case, the defendant
policyholder argued that Pennsylvania's antisubrogation statute precluded an ERISA plan's demand for reimbursement. 3 9
The Court found that the antisubrogation law "related to" an
employee benefit plan and was prima facie preempted, 40 but
that the saving clause "return[ed] the matter of subrogation to
state law" since the law was directed at insurance.41 The state
antisubrogation law did not reach the ERISA plan in question,
however, because as a self-funded plan it could not be "deemed"
an insurance company for purposes of the law. 42 FMC Corp.
means that state antisubrogation statutes are preempted as
applied to self-funded ERISA plans but not as to insured
43
ERISA plans.
State make-whole doctrines fare even worse under ERISA.
The doctrine provides the "default understanding" of an ERISA

36. Gerosa, 329 F.3d at 323 (quoting N.Y State Conference of Blue Cross
& Blue Shield Plans, 514 U.S. at 656).
37. "ERISA says nothing about subrogation provisions. ERISA neither requires a welfare plan to contain a subrogation clause nor does it bar such
clauses or otherwise regulate their content." Member Servs. Life Ins. Co. v.
Am. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Sapulpa, 130 F.3d 950, 958 (10th Cir. 1997)
(quoting Ryan v. Fed. Express Corp., 78 F.3d 123, 127 (3d Cir. 1996)); see also
Baron, supra note 15, at 617 (noting that "nothing in the ERISA scheme endorses reimbursement or suggests that reimbursement is permitted under
ERISA"). ERISA's silence may result from the fact that "reimbursement," a
recent development in insurance law, was not prevalent at the time of
ERISA's drafting and that "the idea of reimbursement had yet to be presented
or approved by the courts." Id. at 618.
38. 498 U.S. 52 (1990).
39. Id. at 55.
40. See id. at 58-60.
41. Id. at 60-61.
42. See id. at 61-62.
43. See Baron, supra note 17, at 586.
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plan. 44 However, the ERISA plan may overcome the doctrine
simply by clearly indicating an intent to do so in the plan language. 4 5 State make-whole doctrines provide no meaningful
protection to ERISA policyholders since even a boilerplate46 subrogation clause in the plan language negates the doctrine.
1.

Great-West Life & Annuity Insurance Co. v. Knudson

Precludes Actions "At Law" by ERISA Plans
While the state antisubrogation laws that exist may be
preempted, and any reasonably careful insurer can avoid state
make-whole doctrines, ERISA plans cannot obtain reimbursement at will from their policyholders. The Supreme Court's de47
cision in Great-West Life & Annuity Insurance Co. v. Knudson
revived the archaic distinction between actions "at law" and
those "at equity" in holding that, under ERISA, plans could obtain reimbursement only through actions "typically available at
equity."48 To understand why, it is necessary to sketch ERISA's
remedial provisions.
ERISA provides that a plan fiduciary may bring a civil action for an injunction against a plan violation or "to obtain
49
other appropriate equitable relief to redress such violations."
In Mertens v. Hewitt Associates,5 0 plan participants sought
damages from, inter alia, an actuarial firm whose work allegedly led to the insolvency of a benefit pension plan sponsor.
Justice Scalia, in a five-to-four decision, held that money dam-

44. See Sanders v. Scheideler, 816 F. Supp. 1338, 1347 (W.D. Wis. 1993)
(observing that "[a]doption of the make whole doctrine as a default priority
rule appears consistent with the congressional mandate to fashion federal
common law to facilitate the ERISA scheme"), aff'd, 25 F.3d 1053 (7th Cir.
1994).
45. See Cagle v. Bruner, 112 F.3d 1510, 1521 (11th Cir. 1997) ("[Tlhe
make whole doctrine applies to limit a plan's subrogation rights where an insured has not received compensation for his total loss and the plan does not
explicitly preclude operationof the doctrine." (emphasis added)).
46. In re Paris, 44 F. Supp. 2d 747, 748 (D. Md. 1999), affd, 211 F.3d 1265

(4th Cir. 2000).
47. 534 U.S. 204 (2002).
48. See infra notes 55-57 and accompanying text (emphasis omitted).
49. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3)(B) (2000) (internal numbering omitted). Section
1132(a)(3) provides an ERISA plan's only means of civil enforcement; ERISA's
other remedies are restricted to plan participants or beneficiaries. See id.
§ 1132(a).
50. 508 U.S. 248 (1993).
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ages are a "classic form of legal relief' and therefore not authorized by ERISA's "equitable relief" provision. 51
The legal/equitable distinction resurfaced in Knudson.
Great-West, the insurer of an ERISA plan, paid approximately
$350,000 to Janet Knudson for medical expenses stemming
from a car accident in which she was rendered a quadriplegic. 52
Knudson subsequently settled a tort suit against the car manufacturer and other alleged tortfeasors for $650,000.53 GreatWest sued for specific performance of the plan's reimbursement
provision, which gave Great-West "'the right to recover from
the [beneficiary] any payment for benefits' paid by the Plan
that the beneficiary is entitled to recover from a third party."54
In another five-to-four decision penned by Justice Scalia,
the Court held that because ERISA is a "'comprehensive and
reticulated statute,"' the judiciary may not extend remedies beyond those specifically authorized in its text. 55 Following
Mertens, Scalia wrote that "equitable relief" refers to "'those
categories of relief that were typically available in equity."' 56 By
asking for performance of the reimbursement provision, GreatWest sought to impose a contractual obligation on Knudson,
and a contractual obligation is a classic form of legal relief.5 7

Therefore, ERISA did not allow Great-West the relief it
58
sought.
Scalia spurned Great-West's attempts to shoehorn its action into one of the equitable categories authorized by ERISA. 59
Great-West argued that it sought restitution, which, as an equitable form of relief, was authorized by ERISA.60 Indeed, in
Mertens, Scalia himself had identified restitution as a form of
relief typically available at equity. 6 1 Scalia rejected this argument, but had to backtrack on his Mertens opinion to do so:
"'restitution is a legal remedy when ordered in a case at law...
and an equitable remedy when ordered in an equity case,' and
51. Id. at 255.
52. Knudson, 534 U.S. at 207.
53. Id.
54. Id. (citing Joint Appendix at 58(a), Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co.
v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204 (2002) (No. 99-1786)).
55. Id. at 209 (quoting Mertens, 508 U.S. at 251).
56. Id. at 210 (quoting Mertens, 508 U.S. at 256).
57. Id. at 214.
58. Id. at 218.
59. Id. at 212-16.
60. Id. at 212.
61. Id. at 215 (citing Mertens, 508 U.S. at 256).
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whether it is legal or equitable depends on 'the basis for [the
plaintiffs] claim' and the nature of the underlying remedies
sought."62 Because Great-West's action was not for particular
that the claim
funds, but rather for any funds, Scalia concluded 63
was legal, not equitable, and subject to dismissal.
Great-West's action was not authorized by ERISA, according to Scalia, because "the funds to which [Great-West]
claim[ed] an entitlement.. . [were] not in [Knudson's] possession." 64 In contrast, Scalia wrote, "a plaintiff could seek restitution in equity, ordinarily in the form of a constructive trust or
an equitable lien, where money or property identified as belonging in good conscience to the plaintiff could clearly be
traced to particular funds or property in the defendant's possession."65 The obvious import of Scalia's opinion was that an
ERISA insurer who properly pleaded for imposition of a constructive trust or equitable lien upon funds identifiable and in
the defendant's possession would be allowed to proceed with its
66
cause of action.
2. Reimbursement Under the Possession Theory
Virtually every federal court since Knudson has adhered to
the "possession theory," which holds that "where funds in the
actual or constructive possession of a plan beneficiary are
traceable to money or property identified as belonging in good
conscience to" the ERISA plan, the plan may seek a constructive trust or equitable lien as "other equitable relief" available
under ERISA.67 Under this theory, an ERISA insurer may impose a constructive trust or equitable lien upon "funds that are
specifically identifiable, that belong in good conscience to the
62. Id. at 213 (quoting Reich v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 33 F.3d 754, 756 (7th Cir.
1994)).
63. Id. at 214, 221. Justice Scalia also rejected Great-West's claim that it
sought "'to enjoin a[n] act or practice"' contrary to the policy; the Court held
that "an injunction to compel the payment of money past due under a contract.., was not typically available in equity." Id. at 210-11 (internal citation
omitted).
64. See id. at 214.
65. Id. at 213.
66. The Court expressed "no opinion as to whether petitioners could have
intervened in the state-court tort action brought by respondents," or "whether
a direct action by petitioners against respondents asserting state-law claims
such as breach of contract would have been pre-empted by ERISA." Id. at 220.
67. See Mid Atlantic Med. Servs., Inc. v. Sereboff, 303 F. Supp. 2d 691,
695 (D. Md. 2004); see also B.P. Amoco Corp. v. Connell, 320 F. Supp. 2d 1368,
1371 (M.D. Ga. 2004) (noting the "possession theory" label for this approach).
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Plan, and that are within the possession and control of the de68
.
fendant ERISA beneficiary."
The Fifth Circuit decision in Bombardier Aerospace Employee Welfare Benefits Plan v. Ferrer,Poirotand Wansbrough69
illustrates the application of the possession theory. An ERISA
plan sought funds that, like those in Knudson, came from a
specifically identifiable fund of money traceable to a third-party
settlement.70 Moreover, as in Knudson, the plan's terms contained an express, unambiguous reimbursement provision establishing the plan's claim to the funds.7 1 In contrast to
Knudson, however, the Bombardier policyholder had control of
the funds in question.7 2 Thus, the Fifth Circuit held, the plan
could assert a constructive trust upon the funds under
3
Knudson's reasoning.7
The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin, in Forsling v. J.J. Keller & Associates, Inc.,74 also attempted to follow Knudson by adopting the possession theory.
The Forsling court delineated a four-part test for a truly equitable action:
First, a defendant must be in possession of disputed funds.... Second, the funds must not have been dissipated .... Third, the party
seeking equitable relief must not be attempting to impose personal liability on the opposing party.... Finally, the money at issue must be
identifiable and must belong in good conscience to the party seeking
7
relief. 5

The court noted that:
Knudson, by its own language, did not bar plan administrators from
bringing an action to obtain reimbursement for benefits they paid. Instead the court expressly embraced the use of constructive trusts and
other forms of equitable relief directed toward the funds from which
reimbursement was sought while still in the possession of the defendant, as opposed to an action at law for damages against the injured
party.

76

68. Bombardier Aerospace Employee Welfare Benefits Plan v. Ferrer, Poirot & Wansbrough, 354 F.3d 348, 355-56 (5th Cir. 2003) (internal numbering
omitted), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 2412 (2004).
69. Id.
70. Id. at 356.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. See id. at 358.
74. 241 F. Supp. 2d 915, 918 (E.D. Wis. 2003).
75. Id. (internal citations omitted).
76. Id. at 919.
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"Possession" under the possession theory is construed
broadly. Thus, funds in the ERISA beneficiary's bank account
have been held the proper subject of equitable relief,7 7 but so
have funds deposited in a registry of the court, 78 as well as
funds held by the defendant's attorney, 79 held in trust for the
defendant,8 0 held by the third-party tortfeasor's attorney,8 1 and
82
held by the tortfeasor's insurer.
86
83
Fifth, s 4 Seventh, 85 Eighth,
Courts in the Fourth,
77. See Mid Atlantic Med. Servs. v. Sereboff, 303 F. Supp. 2d 691, 696 (defendants held money in an investment account).
78. See, e.g., Admin. Comm. of the Wal-Mart Assocs. Health & Welfare
Plan v. Willard, 302 F. Supp. 2d 1267, 1271 (D. Kan. 2004) (tortfeasor deposited funds with court as part of settlement agreement), aff'd, No. 04-3081,
2004 WL 2988571, at *5-6 (10th Cir. Dec. 28, 2004); Sealy, Inc. v. Nationwide
Mut. Ins. Co., 286 F. Supp. 2d 625, 628 (M.D. N.C. 2003) (funds deposited in a
registry of the court by interpleading insurer). But see Bauhaus USA, Inc. v.
Copeland, 292 F.3d 439, 445 (5th Cir. 2002) (holding that although funds were
on deposit in a registry of court, the facts were "indistinguishable in principle
from Great-West").
79. See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. Assocs. Health & Welfare Plan v.
Wells, 213 F.3d 398, 401 (7th Cir. 2000) ("[T]he lawyer's interception of the
entire amount en route from the insurer to the plan is clearly wrongful.");
IBEW-NECA S.W. Health & Benefit Fund v. Douthitt, 211 F. Supp. 2d 812,
816 (N.D. Tex. 2002) (holding that funds held by the defendant's attorney are
"presently within [the defendant's] possession and control"), af'd, Int'l Bd. of
Elec. Workers v. Douthitt, 98 Fed. Appx. 306 (5th Cir. 2004).
80. See, e.g., Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Brown, 192 F. Supp.
2d 1376 (M.D. Ga. 2002) (funds in trust account); Corporate Benefit Servs. of
Am., Inc. v. Sempf, No. 03-C-0048-C, 2003 WL 21704145, at *4-5 (W.D. Wis.
May 9, 2003) (funds in revocable living trust); B.P. Amoco Corp. v. Connell,
320 F. Supp. 2d 1368, 1372 (M.D. Ga. 2004) (special needs trust). Note that
the Knudson funds were also in a special needs trust. Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 207 (2002). However, Knudson did
not decide whether Great-West could have obtained equitable relief against
the trustee since Great-West did not appeal the district court's denial of its
motion to amend its complaint to add the trustee as a defendant. Id. at 220.
81. See Primax Recoveries, Inc. v. Young, 83 Fed. Appx. 523, 525 (4th Cir.
2003).
82. See Forsling v. J.J. Keller & Assocs., Inc., 241 F. Supp. 2d 915, 919
(E.D. Wis. 2003).
83. See, e.g., Primax Recoveries, 83 Fed. Appx. at 525 ("Because Primax
seeks a constructive trust on identifiable funds that they claim belong in good
conscience to them, and those funds are in Young's possession, we find Primax
properly proceeded under ERISA.").
84. E.g. Bombardier Aerospace Employee Welfare Benefits Plan v. Ferrer,
Poirot & Wansbrough, 354 F.3d 348, 356 (5th Cir. 2003).
85. See, e.g., Forsling,241 F. Supp. 2d at 919.
86. See, e.g., Allison v. Wellmark, Inc., No. COO-3015-MWB, 2002 WL
31818946, at *9 (N.D. Iowa Oct. 15, 2002) (holding that "equity requires the
imposition of a constructive trust on the insurance proceeds at issue").
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Tenth,87 Eleventh,8 8 and D.C.89 Circuits have adopted the possession theory. In so doing, these courts believe they are giving
proper weight to Justice Scalia's distinction between legal and
equitable restitution in Knudson.90 Courts in the First, Second,
and Third Circuits have yet to take a position on the possession
theory. 91
II. PUBLIC POLICY SUPPORTS ABOLISHING
REIMBURSEMENT ACTIONS BY INSURERS
Before examining the failings of the possession theory, it is
helpful to understand why courts should want to prevent insurers' reimbursement actions. If the plan language calls for reimbursement, why not allow it? Technical deficiencies in the
possession theory aside, there are strong policy reasons to oppose insurers' attempts to recover money from their injured
policyholders.
A. INSURERS' FLAWED ARGUMENTS FOR REIMBURSEMENT

Insurers frequently justify subrogation actions by proclaiming that the injured policyholder should not receive a

87. See, e.g., Admin. Comm. of the Wal-Mart Assocs. Health & Welfare
Plan v. Willard, 302 F. Supp. 2d 1267, 1275 (D. Kan. 2004) (holding that fiduciary's suit to obtain declaratory relief with regard to proceeds in the custody
of the court is equitable in nature), affd, No. 04-3081, 2004 WL 2988571, at
*5-6 (10th Cir. Dec. 28, 2004).
88. See, e.g., B.P. Amoco Corp. v. Connell, 320 F. Supp. 2d 1368, 1372
(M.D. Ga. 2004) ("[T]he most important consideration is that the settlement
proceeds are still intact, and thus constitute an identifiable res that can be restored to its rightful recipient.").
89. See, e.g., Primax Recoveries, Inc. v. Lee, 260 F. Supp. 2d 43 (D.D.C.
2003).
90. See, e.g., Forsling, 241 F. Supp. 2d at 918 ('1 therefore conclude that
the plain language of Knudson authorizes Keller's third-party action as an equitable action for a constructive trust over the funds possessed by defendant
Shelby Mutual.")
91. See Radford Trust v. First Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., 321 F. Supp. 2d
226, 254 n.23 (D. Mass. 2004) (noting that "[t]he First Circuit has taken note
of Knudson, but has not determined what effect the case has on prior case law
governing the availability of particular kinds of relief under Section
1132(a)(3)(B)"). The Third Circuit has not explicitly adopted the possession
theory, although its opinion in Skretvedt v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours applied an
analysis similar to the possession theory in holding that an ERISA policyholder was entitled to an award of prejudgment interest from an ERISA plan.
372 F.3d 193, 214 (3rd Cir. 2004) (noting that the policyholder "has sufficiently identified specific funds traceable to the defendant ERISA plans that
belong in good conscience to him").

2005]

INSULT TO INJURY

1227

windfall by virtue of being injured. Without reimbursement,
the argument goes, the policyholder will receive a "double re92
covery": once from the insurer, and again from the tortfeasor.
This argument fails in several ways. First, in almost every case
the policyholder will never be made whole. "The sad fact in the
vast majority of these critical injury cases is that the insured is
left not only seriously impaired for life, but, if reimbursement is
permitted, the insured is also left financially destitute."93 Historically, the policy against double recovery by a policyholder
arose in the context of property insurance, where the value of
damage may be ascertained with reasonable accuracy and
there is little danger that the property owner will wind up undercompensated. 94 In personal injury cases, it is much more
likely that the injured policyholder will not receive adequate
compensation. 95 In In re Paris,96 for example, a twenty-fouryear-old man was permanently brain damaged when injured in
a motorcycle accident. After recovering a $100,000 settlement,
he sought a declaratory judgment that a state make-whole doctrine precluded subrogation by his ERISA plan. 97 The U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland needed only two pages
to conclude that the make-whole doctrine did not apply and to
award summary judgment for the plan, 98 even though the
$100,000 settlement was insufficient to satisfy the subrogation
claim. 99 The court also declined to reduce the subrogation
award to compensate Paris for his attorney's fees. 10 0 Paris's
mother was thus left to pay years of medical expenses for her
twenty-four-year-old, brain-damaged son, as well as pay her
own attorney's fees and the remainder of the subrogation
judgment without the benefit of any of the third-party settlement.
92. See Rinaldi, supra note 19, at 803.
93. Baron, supra note 15, at 597. For example, insurers contended in
Knudson that the quadriplegic defendant was receiving a "windfall ...[which]
must inexorably come out of the pockets of the rest." Brief of Amici Curiae the
American Associations of Health Plans et al. at 16, Great-West Life & Annuity
Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204 (2002) (No. 99-1786). It is unlikely that Ms.
Knudson believed the loss of the use of her limbs led to a "windfall."
94. Baron, supra note 15, at 624.
95. Id. at 625-26.
96. 44 F. Supp. 2d 747, 748 (D. Md. 1999), affd, 211 F.3d 1265 (4th Cir.
2000).
97. Id.
98. Id. at 748-49.
99. Id. at 748.
100. Id. at 749.
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Second, after reimbursement the insurer has received a
double recovery: once from the policyholder's faithful (but now
wasted) premium payments and again from the reimbursement. 10 1 Even granting the unlikely proposition that the injured party has recovered "double," there is no obvious reason
why public policy would favor a transfer of the double recovery
to the insurer rather than to the injured policyholder, who exhibited the foresight and prudence to acquire insurance in the
first place.
Third, insurers contend that subrogation forces the tortfeasor to bear the burden of reimbursing the insurer for the loss
caused by the tortfeasor's own acts or omissions. 102 This straw
man argument "proves" only what was never in dispute: that a
tortfeasor ought to be liable for his wrong. Under the collateralsource rule, it is generally presumed that "a plaintiff who has
been compensated in whole or in part for his damages by a
source independent of the tortfeasor is nevertheless entitled to
a full recovery against the tortfeasor."103 But simply asserting
that the tortfeasor ought to pay does not decide whether the injured policyholder or the ERISA plan should benefit from that
payment.
A fourth argument is that without subrogation insurers
would need to make up the difference by charging more to society as a whole. 104 This argument would be sensible if insurers
actually did calculate future subrogation recoveries into current premium payments, but they do not. "[I]nsurers consistently fail to introduce the factor of such recoveries into ratedetermining formulae, but rather apply such recoveries to increasing dividends to shareholders." 105 Indeed, "the conjectural
101. David M. Kono, Note, Unravelingthe Lining of ERISA Health Insurer
Pockets-A Vote for National Federal Common Law Adoption of the Make
Whole Doctrine, 2000 BYU L. REV. 427, 446.
102. Rinaldi, supra note 19, at 803.
103. See Potvin v. Seven Elms, Inc., 628 A.2d 115, 116 (Me. 1993).
104. Cunningham v. Metro Life Ins. Co., 360 N.W.2d 33, 37 (Wis. 1985)
("Other proponents of the subrogation doctrine assert that it returns the excess, duplicative proceeds to the insurer who can then recycle them in the form
of lower insurance premiums."); Silinsky v. State-Wide Ins. Co., 289 N.Y.S. 2d
541, 549 (N.Y. App. Div. 1968) (noting that subrogation hopefully lowers premium rates).
105. JOHN F. DOBBYN, INSURANCE LAW IN A NUTSHELL 284 (3d ed. 1996);
see also Baron, supra note 17, at 582. But see F. Joseph Du Bray, A Response
to the Anti-Subrogation Argument: What Really Emerged from Pandora'sBox,
41 S.D. L. REV. 264, 273-74 (1996) (contending that "subrogation operates to
reduce the actual past cost total used in the calculation of probable future in-
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and remote nature of subrogation militates against including it
06
as a factor in premium rate setting."1
B. ERISA PREEMPTION OF STATE ANTISUBROGATION
LAWS AND MAKE-WHOLE DOCTRINES UNDERMINES ERISA's
PRIMARY PURPOSE
Generally, congressional intent to preempt state law must
be "'clear and manifest."' 107 Courts should not interpret federal
statutes to preempt state law in traditional areas of state governance unless the federal government unambiguously requires
such a construction. 108 Since there is no express intent in
ERISA's text to preempt state antisubrogation laws and makewhole doctrines, courts should not read it to do so. 10 9

Moreover, preemption actively thwarts ERISA's stated
purpose. Recall that ERISA's implementation of nationwide
standards for employee benefit plans was a means to ERISA's
ultimate purpose of protecting employees. 110 When the judiciary adopts the lowest common denominator of employee protection, as is the case with across-the-board preemption of state
antisubrogation and common law make-whole doctrines, it undermines the very concerns that inspired ERISA's drafting in
surable risk or loss on which future premiums will be based").
106. Baron, supra note 17, at 582.
107. N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers
Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 655 (1995) (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp.,
331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
108. Id. at 654-55; FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 67 (1990) (Stevens,
J., dissenting) ("When there is ambiguity in a statutory provision preempting
state law, we should apply a strong presumption against the invalidation of
well-settled, generally applicable state rules.").
109. Others have argued that ERISA's current preemptive scope is broader
than Congress intended. See Brief of Amicus Curiae United States at 22-23,
UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am. v. Ward, 526 U.S. 358 (1999) (No. 97-1868) ("Congress has saved state substantive law, and it is not clear why Congress would
have wanted to foreclose all access to state-created remedies or sanctions to
enforce that substantive law, especially where the causes of action provided
under Section 502 itself are not suited to that purpose." (internal citation
omitted)); Elaine Gareri Kenney, For the Sake of Your Health: ERISA's Preemption Provisions, HMO Accountability, and Consumer Access to State Law
Remedies, 38 U.S.F. L. REV. 361, 367 (2004) (arguing that the Supreme Court's
decision in Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41 (1987), needlessly expanded ERISA preemption).
110. H.R. REP. No. 93-533, at 8-9 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N.
4639, 4647 (noting that Congress was ultimately driven by "the absolute need
that safeguards for plan participants be sufficiently adequate and effective to
prevent the numerous inequities to workers under plans which have resulted
in tragic hardship to so many"); see supra notes 20-25 and accompanying text.

1230

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[89:1214

the first place. In Knudson, for instance, had Great-West properly named Janette Knudson's special needs trustee as a defendant and pleaded a constructive trust, under the possession
theory Great-West would have recovered and left the policyholder destitute as well as quadriplegic. Such an outcome
would not square well with ERISA's stated goal of preventing
inequities and hardships to workers. "[T]he inescapable conclusion is that the spirit and purpose of ERISA provide greater
support for prohibition of reimbursement than for its authorization."1 1 1
Some scholars urge the Supreme Court to implement a
federal common law make-whole doctrine in the ERISA regime. 112 The Supreme Court's ERISA jurisprudence does not
preclude this: Knudson did not address the fact that Knudson
was not made whole by her settlement recovery or whether that
fact made any difference to the subrogation analysis, and therefore does not preclude a court from applying the make-whole
doctrine to funds within the beneficiary's possession. 113 Furthermore, the necessity of interstitial federal common law in
ERISA's regulatory scheme is well-recognized. 114 For now,
however, federal common law holds that the make-whole doctrine is overcome by an express provision in the language of the
15
insurance policy.1
III. REIMBURSEMENT UNDER THE POSSESSION
THEORY IS NOT RELIEF "TYPICALLY AVAILABLE AT
EQUITY," AS REQUIRED BY KNUDSON
ERISA preemption of state antisubrogation and makewhole doctrines is a boon to insurers, 116 who can now bring
111. Baron, supra note 15, at 619; see also Korobkin, supra note 20, at 48384 (arguing that the broad ERISA preemption doctrine "created a body of law
that did not effectuate ERISA's underlying purposes").
112. See, e.g., Baron, supra note 15, at 626-27; Kono, supra note 101, at
449-50.
113. Cowart, supra note 18, at 670.
114. See Jamail, Inc. v. Carpenters Dist. Council, 954 F.2d 299, 303 (5th
Cir. 1992) ("[T]he inevitable incompleteness presented by all legislation means
that interstitial federal lawmaking is a basic responsibility of the federal
courts."); Cooperative Benefit Admin., Inc. v. Ogden, 367 F.3d 323, 329 (5th
Cir. 2004) (recognizing that federal common law is appropriate to fill "minor
gaps" in ERISA's text).
115. See supra notes 44-46 and accompanying text.
116. This is generally true whether the action is brought by the ERISA
plan or its insurer, since the plan, upon obtaining reimbursement, will be required in turn to reimburse the insurer. In Knudson, for example, the plan
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against their own policyholders reimbursement actions that
historically were barred. The Supreme Court's Knudson decision limited, but did not eliminate, the relief that insurers
could pursue. Properly understood, however, Knudson leaves
an ERISA insurer without any viable cause of action for reimbursement against its policyholder, because the policyholder
possesses no funds traceable to the insurer upon which the
court may impose a constructive trust or equitable lien. This
result is consistent with ERISA's goal of protecting employees,
prevents a double recovery by the insurer, affords the policyholder the rightful benefits of her own foresight, and may result in slightly lower dividends for insurers' shareholders but
will not directly result in higher insurance premiums.
A. REQUIREMENTS FOR A CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST OR
EQUITABLE LIEN

"Restitution," as Justice Scalia intimated in Knudson, can
mean many different things. 117 Among the restitutionary
remedies available at equity were the constructive trust and
the equitable lien, 118 and Scalia named these as the options
available to insurers seeking reimbursement within ERISA's
statutory framework. 119
A court will impose a constructive trust where one party
has acquired property that does not in good conscience belong
to her, and to which another party is entitled.120 A constructive
trust, unlike a remedy at law, requires that the disputed property be in the possession of the defendant. 121 If a constructive
trust is to be imposed on money, it must be an identifiable fund
traceable to the plaintiff.122 The court then labels the defendant

contributed $75,000 to Janette Knudson's $411,157 worth of medical bills,
while the plan's insurer paid the rest. If the plan had been permitted to recover, the recovery would have been apportioned accordingly, with over eighty
percent of the recovery going to the insurer. Baron, supra note 15, at 620.
117. See supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text; 1 DAN B. DOBBS,
DOBBS LAW OF REMEDIES § 1.1, at 6 (2d ed. 1993) ("So restitution today is a
general term for diverse kinds of recoveries aimed at preventing unjust enrichment of the defendant and measured by the defendant's gains, but it has
many specific forms, each of which must be addressed separately.").
118. See 1 DOBBS, supra note 117, § 4.3(1), at 587.
119. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
120.

4 JOHN NORTON POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE

§ 1048, at 104 (1941).
121. 1 DOBBS, supra note 117, § 4.3(2), at 591.
122. Id. at 590.
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(in a reimbursement action, the policyholder) a constructive
trustee and orders that title be transferred to the plaintiff (the
ERISA plan or insurer) as the constructive beneficiary. 123 For
example, if I fraudulently acquire title to Blackacre from you,
an equity court would declare that I hold Blackacre in construc124
tive trust for you and order me to convey title to you.

The equitable lien may arise in two situations. Generally,
an equitable lien may operate as a limited form of constructive
trust, giving the plaintiff a security interest in certain property
to prevent unjust enrichment. 125 This type of equitable lien differs from a constructive trust in that the lien may be foreclosed
by forcing the sale of the property in question to pay the plaintiff, but the plaintiff may not obtain title to the res in question. 126 For instance, if I build an addition on my house with
money I embezzled from you, you may impose an equitable lien
upon the house and lot for the amount embezzled, but you may
not impose a constructive trust to acquire title to my house,
127
since you would then be unjustly enriched.
An equitable lien may also arise by express or implied-infact agreement between the parties that a certain fund or piece
of property will stand as security for a debt. 128 If the pledge
failed to satisfy some requirement for enforcement at law, it
might be recognized and enforced by a court of equity and thus
1 29
become "equitable."'
Both the constructive trust and the equitable lien require
particular assets that can be identified as belonging in good
conscience to the plaintiff, and that can be traced to the plaintiff in some way. 130 "[T]he trust or lien is invoked only when
there is a specific res-either the funds taken from the plaintiff
13
or property the wrongdoer has exchanged for those funds."'
123. Id. § 4.3(1), at 587.
124. See id. § 4.3(2), at 591.
125. Id. § 4.3(3), at 601.
126. Id. at 603.
127. Id. at 602.
128. Id. at 601-02.
129. Id. at 601.
130. Id. at 603; see also In re Fin. Federated Title & Trust, Inc., 347 F.3d
880, 891 (11th Cir. 2003) ("[I]t is the burden of the party seeking to impress a
constructive trust to trace the property to specific funds before it can prevail."); RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 161 cmt. e (1937) ("Where... the
property subject to the equitable lien can no longer be traced, the equitable
lien cannot be enforced.").
131. 2 DOBBS, supra note 117, § 6.1(2), at 7-8.
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The underlying "idea is that the plaintiff's property has been
found in the hands of the defendant and must be restored to
the plaintiff, .. . even if the property has undergone a change in
form." 132 Thus where I receive some of your money by mistake
and use it to purchase a cow, you may recover the cow, or force
its sale to recover the funds. However, where you can show only
that I received your money but cannot demonstrate that these
specific funds are still in my possession, you have established a
debt claim that may be pursued at law, but not an equity claim
for a constructive trust or equitable lien. 133 "It is hornbook law
that before a constructive trust may be imposed, a claimant to
own property into a
a wrongdoer's property must trace his
13 4
wrongdoer."'
the
of
hands
the
in
product
Two additional features of constructive trusts as typically
granted by courts of equity are noteworthy. First, courts of equity balanced ethical and economic considerations when granting remedies such as a constructive trust; if the balance of the
hardships did not favor granting the remedy, the court would
by the defennot grant it. 1 3 5 Second, "restitution is measured
1 36
dant's gains, not by the plaintiffs losses."'
B. THE ERISA PLAN CANNOT ASSERT A CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST
OR EQUITABLE LIEN UPON FUNDS THAT ARE NOT TRACEABLE TO
THE PLAN
The possession theory ignores an essential requirement of
the constructive trust or equitable lien: the res sought must be
traceable to the plaintiff.137 In a reimbursement action, however, the only money traceable to the plaintiff is that which has
already been dissipated to pay for the policyholder's medical
expenses. The third-party recovery, upon which the insurer
seeks the trust or lien, is not traceable to the insurer; the in132. Id. § 6.1(3), at 11.
133. Id. at 12.
134. United States v. Benitez, 779 F.2d 135, 140 (2d Cir. 1985).
135. 1 DOBBS, supra note 117, § 2.4(1), at 90-91. As Dobbs explains:
When equitable relief is sought, courts claim the power to deny that
relief as a matter of discretion .... Discretion to deny or to limit equitable relief is normally invoked by considering an equitable defense
which permits wide latitude in decision-making, or by "balancing" equities, hardships, and the interests of the public and of third persons.
Id. Thus, "[e]ven when an equitable defense does not bar the claim, the total
balance of equities and hardships might do so." Id. at 91.
136. Id. § 1.1, at 5.
137. See supra Part III.A.
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surer's only claimed right to that fund is the contract right embodied in the ERISA plan, and this relief is absolutely foreclosed after Knudson.
A plaintiff can impress a constructive trust upon a res different from that which the defendant wrongfully appropriated
in only one situation: where the defendant disposes of the
wrongfully acquired property, a constructive trust may be impressed upon the proceeds of the sale. 138 This avenue will afford
no relief to an ERISA insurer, however, because the policyholder has used the funds she received under the terms of her
health plan for exactly its stated purpose: payment of medical
expenses. She has "wrongfully disposed of" nothing, and "where
the disposition made of property is not wrongful, no constructive trust arises."'139 And, at any rate, no one has ever suggested
that insurers ought to be able to collect the hospital beds, prostheses, and other accoutrements purchased with the insurer's
money, or force their sale to satisfy the insurer's reimbursement claim.
Consider again a classic illustration of a constructive trust:
I fraudulently obtain title to Blackacre from you. An equity
court might find that I hold Blackacre constructively in trust
for you. If I have sold the property, you will be entitled to the
price I received, or to whatever property I purchased with the
money. 140 But if I have sold Blackacre and no longer possess
the money or any substituted asset, there is nothing upon
which to impose a constructive trust; you are a creditor with an
action at law against me, but no action in equity. If I have recently received a sum of money from the sale of some other
property, you cannot impose a constructive trust or equitable
lien upon this money because it is not traceable to you. You are
analogous to the insurer in a reimbursement action, whose
property has been dissipated and is no longer traceable in any
form to the policyholder's possession.
Faced with the inapplicability of a constructive trust to its
reimbursement action, the plan may turn to an equitable lien.
The plan cannot assert the more general variety of equitable
lien (that imposed by the court to prevent unjust enrichment)141
upon the policyholder's third-party recovery, however, for the

138.

90 C.J.S. Trusts § 194 (2002).

139. Id.
140.
141.

See 1 DOBBS, supra note 117, § 4.3(2), at 591.
See supra notes 125-29 and accompanying text.
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same reason that it cannot impose a constructive trust. Both
remedies require identifiable, traceable assets in the possession
of the defendant but belonging in good conscience to the plaintiff.142

C. THE ERISA PLAN CANNOT ASSERT A CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST
OR EQUITABLE LIEN UPON A FUND THAT HAS NOT BEEN
APPROPRIATED TO THE PLAN
The plan might then urge imposition of an equitable lien
by express or implied-in-fact agreement, in which "a borrower
agrees that a certain fund or piece of property will stand as security for his debt." 143 This argument is troubling at the outset
because an equitable lien by express or implied agreement presupposes a debt, duty, or obligation owed by the policyholder to
the plan. 144 After collecting the policyholder's premiums, the
plan is asserting that the policyholder must make a further
pledge to receive the benefits for which she contracted. But the
medical benefits paid by the ERISA plan do not create a debt in
the policyholder; they are not loaned to the policyholder contingent upon repayment. The plan is obliged to pay the benefits
regardless of whether the policyholder has any prospect for a
third-party recovery.
More importantly, as a technical matter, an equitable lien
by express agreement upon the third-party recovery fails because creation of an equitable lien by agreement requires that
"the property or fund sought to be charged be distinctly appropriated to, or as security for, the payment of the debt or other
145
liability in question."' An equitable lien requires "more than a
mere expectation, or even an agreement, that a debt will be
46
paid out of a particular fund,"' and "more than a mere promise by a debtor to pay a debt out of a particular fund due him,
14 7
as soon as he receives it."' In a reimbursement action, at the
142.

"[Ihe trust or lien is invoked only when there is a specific res-either

the funds taken from the plaintiff or property the wrongdoer has exchanged
for those funds." 2 DOBBS, supra note 117, § 6.1(2), at 7-8; see supra notes
130-34 and accompanying text.
143. 1 DOBBS, supra note 117, § 4.3(3), at 601.
144. See 51 AM. JUR. 2D Liens § 24 (1970); Id. § 13 (2000) ("Because a lien
is a right to encumber property until a debt is paid, it presupposes the existence of a debt.... In other words, without a debt, there can be no lien.").
145. Id. § 29 (1970). "The promisor must place the fund beyond his control
and grant to the promisee a complete and present right therein .... "Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
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time the policyholder agrees to the plan terms or accepts medical benefits from the plan, she possesses no third-party recovery which she can appropriate to the plan; the most she can offer to the plan is her promise to repay if and when she later
obtains recovery. Such a promise might support a contract
claim, but cannot support an equitable lien by express agreement.
D. THE ERISA PLAN SHOULD NOT BE PERMITTED To AVOID
ERISA's EQUITABLE RELIEF REQUIREMENT BY ASSERTING AN
IMPLIED-IN-FACT EQUITABLE LIEN
Lacking necessary elements of a constructive trust, an equitable lien to prevent unjust enrichment, and an equitable lien
by express agreement, the ERISA plan is left to hang its hat on
an equitable lien by implied-in-fact agreement. This option
looks better for the plan, since an equitable lien "may exist
without agreement ...between the parties to the transaction
and without title or possession in the lienholder."148 Once a
court has wandered this far into the mists of equitable actions,
it will discern few principles to guide its decision; as Justice
Holmes noted, "the phrase 'equitable lien' may not carry the
reasoning further or do much more than express the opinion of
the court that the facts give a priority to the party said to have
it ... ,"149 The only boundaries on the court's discretion to find
an implied-in-fact equitable lien appear to be "general considerations of right and justice." 5 0
Recall, though, that the essence of the implied-in-fact equitable lien is that the parties intended to create a lien but the
agreement was somehow incapable of enforcement in a court of
law.151 An equity court would intervene to create the lien and
give effect to the contractual intentions of the parties, in effect
providing legal relief when a court of law was prevented from
doing so by some technical defect. In an ERISA reimbursement
action, however, the plan and the participant have usually entered into an express, written agreement that includes a reimbursement clause, enforceable on its face. The issue with the
148. Id. § 30; Warren Tool Co. v. Stephenson, 161 N.W.2d 133, 140 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1968) ("It is now well settled that non-existence of the fund at the

time of the agreement does not prevent establishment of an equitable lien on
the fund....").
149. Sexton v. Kessler & Co., 225 U.S. 90, 98-99 (1912).
150. 51 AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 144, § 30 (1970).
151. 1 DOBBS, supra note 117, § 4.3(3), at 601.
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reimbursement provision is not that it is somehow legally deficient, but that ERISA does not afford the insurer the legal
cause of action necessary to enforce the agreement. To allow an
ERISA plan to give effect to the legal remedy contemplated by
the reimbursement clause simply by clothing it in equitable
garb would be to eviscerate Knudson's legal/equitable distinction and leave no discernible limit on the relief available to
ERISA plans. Since "'[e]quitable' relief must mean something
less than all relief,"'152 courts should not allow plans to cloak
contract claims in equitable terms solely for the purpose of
avoiding Knudson's bar on legal relief.
Justice Ginsburg, dissenting in Knudson, raised a similar
prospect of relief for ERISA plans: allow the plan to enforce an
injunction (an equitable remedy explicitly permitted by
54
ERISA) 153 against a failure to pay a simple indebtedness.1
Scalia's majority opinion rejected this approach as "render[ing]
the statute's limitation of relief... utterly pointless."'155 The
same logic precludes allowing the plan to enforce an equitable
lien by implied-in-fact agreement: by allowing an end-run
around ERISA's preclusion of legal relief, such an approach
would render meaningless ERISA's civil remedies limitations.
To prevent the implied-in-fact equitable lien from swallowing Knudson's legal/equitable distinction whole, courts should
not allow ERISA plans to pursue this cause of action against
policyholders. There are two further reasons courts should
hesitate to grant reimbursement to an ERISA plan on an equitable relief theory: equitable remedies are properly measured
by the defendant's gain, not the plaintiffs loss, and courts of
equity retained discretion to balance the equities and hardships
of each case before granting relief.
E. RECOVERY IN EQUITABLE RESTITUTION IS MEASURED BY THE
DEFENDANT'S GAIN, NOT THE PLAINTIFF'S LOSS

The heart of equitable restitution is the defendant's gain,
not the plaintiff's loss. 1 56 But in most personal injury reim-

bursement cases, the injured defendant has received little or no

152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

Mertens v. Hewitt Assoc., 508 U.S. 248, 258 n.8 (1993).
29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3)(A) (2000).
Great-West Life v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 216 (2002).
Id.
See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
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"gain. ' 157 A case for equitable restitution might be made in
those cases where, after accounting for the defendant's medical
expenses, suffering, lost wages, and attorney's fees, she still
comes out ahead. But even in such a scenario, the amount of
the constructive trust would never be the full amount paid out
by the insurer, because the policyholder has necessarily incurred costs beyond just her medical expenses (including pain
and suffering and attorney fees). Courts that apply the possession theory, however, invariably and erroneously measure the
insurer's relief by the amount paid out by the plan (the insurer's purported "loss"), not the defendant's net "gain" after
the third-party recovery.
F. COURTS OF EQUITY RETAINED DISCRETION TO BALANCE
THE EQUITIES AND HARDSHIPS OF EACH CASE BEFORE
GRANTING RELIEF
Courts of equity retained the prerogative to balance the
equities and hardships of each case before awarding relief. 158
Courts considering ERISA reimbursement actions, however,
seem generally disinclined to consider the potential hardships
awaiting the policyholder if reimbursement is awarded. 159 Were
federal courts to exercise this prerogative, ERISA insurers
would seldom obtain relief, at least not for the full amount they
request. In a reimbursement action, the defendant policyholder
has not only been injured, sometimes catastrophically, but
rarely receives full compensation for her medical expenses, to
say nothing of pain and suffering and lost present and future
wages. After losing the case, she is left in debt to her attorney
with reduced or no income and no remaining insurance benefits. The insurer, meanwhile, receives a windfall that results
not in lower premiums for all, but in higher dividends for the

157.

Consider In re Paris,44 F. Supp. 2d 747 (D. Md. 1999), affd, 211 F.3d

1265 (4th Cir. 2000), in which a twenty-four-year-old, brain-damaged tort vic-

tim was ordered to reimburse his ERISA plan the full value of his $100,000

third-party settlement, leaving his family with nothing to pay his future medi-

cal expenses and past attorney's fees. See also supra Part III.A (debunking insurers' argument that, without reimbursement, injured policyholders receive a
double recovery).
158. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
159. See, e.g., In re Paris, 44 F. Supp. 2d at 748 (noting that an ERISA
plan's motion for summary judgment entitling it to the entire value of a braindamaged policyholder's third-party settlement "raises only a legal issue" (emphasis added)).
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insurer's shareholders. 160 Courts of equity would be extremely
unlikely to award such relief in light of a balancing analysis.
IV. THE SIXTH AND NINTH CIRCUITS' APPROACH TO
THE POSSESSION THEORY
The two circuits that refuse to recognize insurers' causes of
action for reimbursement, unfortunately, do so with less than
compelling reasoning: the Ninth Circuit misrepresents
Knudson' 6' and the nature of constructive trusts, while the
Sixth Circuit simply announces by fiat that reimbursement actions are, by nature, legal.
A. THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S APPROACH To DENYING
REIMBURSEMENT IGNORES THE CLEAR IMPORT OF KNUDSON AND
MISSTATES THE LAW OF CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTS

The Ninth Circuit, ever the black sheep of the federal judiciary, 6 2 took a stand on behalf of employees (and in furtherv.
ance of ERISA's stated purpose) in Westaff (USA) Inc. 164
Arce. 163 Betty Arce was injured in an automobile accident.
The plan administrator paid medical expenses on her behalf,
before Arce received a $15,000 settlement from the third
party. 165 The plan contained a standard reimbursement clause,
providing that the plan "had subrogation and reimbursement
rights in any monies received by a covered person from a third
party tortfeasor."'166 The check was made out to Arce and
Westaff as copayees.16 7 Arce forwarded the check to Westaff for
signature, promising to deposit the funds into escrow until the
168 Westaff obligingly
rightful recipient could be determined.
signed the check and sought a declaratory judgment against

160. See supra notes 104-06 and accompanying text.
161. 534 U.S. 204 (2002); see supra Part I.C.1.
is commonly accepted that the Ninth Circuit is the most watched,
162. "[I]t
and most criticized, of all the lower federal courts in the country." Vikram
David Amar, Lower Court Obedience & the Ninth Circuit, 7 GREEN BAG 2D
315, 315 (2004) (internal quotations omitted).
163. 298 F.3d 1164, 1167 (9th Cir. 2002).
164. Id. at 1166.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
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Arce that it was entitled to reimbursement of the $15,000 it
had paid for her medical expenses. 169
Westaff argued that the relief it sought was equitable because the money it sought was held in escrow. 170 The Ninth
Circuit had little patience for this argument. Noting that it
looked "to the substance of the remedy sought rather than the
label placed on that remedy,"'171 the court easily concluded that
"Westaff is seeking to enforce a contractual obligation for the
payment of money, a classic action at law and not an equitable
claim."1 72 According to the court, Westaffs action differed from
that in Knudson "only in that the money at issue.., has been
placed in an escrow account and remains specifically identifiable." 173 The existence of an identifiable fund of money, clearly

traceable to the policyholder's third-party recovery, was a distinction without a difference in the Westaff court's opinion. But
this is the very difference on which Knudson's holding turned:
"for restitution to lie in equity, the action generally must
seek ...

to restore to the plaintiff particular funds or property

in the defendant's possession." 174 Knudson's only stated reason
for not allowing reimbursement was the lack of an identifiable,
traceable fund of money; Westaff casually dismisses the existence of such a fund as immaterial.
Amazingly, the court asserted that Knudson had actually
affirmed this approach. 175 Later Ninth Circuit opinions stubbornly insist that Knudson supports the circuit's categorical refusal to allow reimbursement actions, contrary to Justice
Scalia's invitation to seek remedies typically available at eq176
uity.

169. Id.
170. Id.
171.

Id. (quoting Watkins v. Westinghouse Hanford Co., 12 F.3d 1517, 1528

n.5 (9th Cir. 1993) (internal quotations and alterations omitted)).
172.

Id.

173.

Id. at 1166 (emphasis added).

-174. Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 214

(2002).
175. Westaff, 298 F.3d at 1166.
176. "Against the weight of authority.., the Ninth Circuit seems to have
ignored the Supreme Court's dicta, as it continues to declare, even after
Knudson, and seemingly without qualification, that reimbursement claims by
ERISA fiduciaries are legal claims for compensatory damages seeking to impose personal liability." Mid Atl. Med. Servs., Inc., v. Sereboff, 303 F. Supp. 2d
691, 695 (D. Md. 2004).
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The Ninth Circuit has also articulated that an action for
constructive trust requires an "ill-gotten" gain and a breach of
fiduciary duty on the part of the defendant. 177 This is incorrect;
a constructive trust redresses unjust enrichment, not wrongdoing, and is therefore not limited to cases involving misconduct. 178 While the Ninth Circuit's refusal to allow subrogation
actions by ERISA insurers is laudable, its reasoning is not. A
better approach is needed.
B. THE SIXTH CIRCUIT'S APPROACH IN QUALCHOICE IS SOUND,
BUT REQUIRES MORE EXPLANATION
In Qualchoice, Inc. v. Rowland, the Sixth Circuit precluded
equitable relief under the possession theory.1 79 The court affirmed the dismissal of the ERISA plan's claim, even though
the plan sought equitable restitution and the defendant possessed an identifiable fund of money. 8 0° In its first postKnudson look at the issue, the court considered but rejected the
possession theory.' 8 ' The court reasoned that Knudson had left
open the question of whether an ERISA insurer could recover a
specifically identifiable fund of money, and that the Knudson
majority repeatedly emphasized that "a breach of contract
claim seeking money damages is a legal action."' 1 2 Even though
Qualchoice sought a constructive trust upon an identified set of
funds, the court found the spirit, if not the letter, of the request
to be legal.'8 3 The court explained that "[t]he problem of formal
title was irrelevant in cases where the plaintiff sought intangibles, such as money; therefore, all plaintiffs could bring such
actions in the courts of law."' 8 4 While equity courts historically

may have imposed a constructive trust on a particular bank account, reasoned the court, the fact that an ERISA beneficiary
deposited funds into a bank account did not change the nature
of contract, not for
of the insurer's action, which was for breach
85
a property right in any particular fund.

FMC Med. Plan v. Owens, 122 F.3d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1997).
1 DOBBS, supra note 117, § 4.3(2), at 597.
179. 367 F.3d 638 (6th Cir. 2004).
180. Id. at 650.
181. See id. at 645-46.
182. Id. at 646.
183. See id. at 649.
184. Id.
185. Id.
177.

178.
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While the Qualchoice result aligns with public policy and a
proper understanding of ERISA, its reasoning is deficient. The
court pointed out that "e]quitable restitution developed to fill
the void left" when legal restitution, which required proof of
formal title to property, was unavailable to the plaintiff. 8 6
From there, the court reasoned that where the property in
question allowed no formal title, as in the case of money, "all
plaintiffs could bring such actions in the courts of law.' 8 7
While this may be true, the availability of an action at law does
not rule out a corresponding action "typically available at equity" as invited by Knudson. Indeed, courts of equity regularly
awarded constructive trusts over funds of money.' 88 The fact
that courts of law could award monetary relief is irrelevant, because Knudson did not require that the insurer's action be one
that was typically available only at equity.
The Sixth Circuit's second rationale for denying relief in
Qualchoice was that "the source of the claim asserted ...is a

contract to pay money" and that equitable remedies were not
typically used in such an action.' 8 9 The court was right, but
made no effort to explain why the action sounded in contract,
not in equity. The court also did not explain where it thought
the six other federal circuits, which apply the possession theory
and presumably would have granted the relief requested by
Qualchoice, went wrong.
CONCLUSION
After Knudson, most federal courts follow the possession
theory and allow ERISA plans to enforce reimbursement
clauses against their policyholders using the equitable mechanisms of constructive trusts and equitable liens. These courts
erroneously believe they are following Knudson's mandate to
allow relief "typically available at equity." In fact, reimbursement actions fail to satisfy the essential elements of either a
186. Id.
187.
188.

Id.
1 DOBBS, supra note 117, § 4.3(2), at 591. If, as seems to be the case,

the court is asserting that funds of money were never the proper subject of a
constructive trust, the court is mistaken. 'The constructive trust is only used
when the defendant has a legally recognized right in a particular asset. ...It
may even be a fund of money like a bank account." Id. "The principle [of constructive trust] is one of universal application; it extends alike to real and to
personal property, to things in action, and funds of money." POMEROY, supra
note 120, § 1044, at 96.
189. Qualchoice, 367 F.3d at 649.
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constructive trust or an equitable lien. In allowing such relief,
federal courts ignore public policy concerns, thwart ERISA's
stated purpose, and misunderstand the nature of the equitable
remedies they purport to grant.
In the final analysis, the Qualchoice court was right: shorn
of creative lawyering and games with pleading, an ERISA
plan's action for reimbursement is ultimately one for contractual relief. The plan cannot assert a constructive trust or ordinary equitable lien upon funds that were never in its possession. The plan cannot assert an equitable lien by express
agreement upon funds that have never been appropriated to it.
The only cause of action mentioned in Knudson for which the
plan can satisfy each required element is an equitable lien by
implied-in-fact agreement, but this is simply a contract claim in
equitable disguise. Furthermore, it is unlikely that a court of
equity considering any of these forms of relief would award
them after considering the true measure of the defendant's
gain, and balancing the equities and hardships in the case.
Courts following the possession theory point to Knudson's
unanswered question: "may an insurer assert a constructive
trust or equitable lien upon an identifiable set of funds in the
possession of the defendant policyholder?" And, they answer
''yes." But the courts are wrong-the answer is "no," in terms of
both policy and substantive law. By correcting their answer,
federal courts would give effect to ERISA's ultimate goal of protecting workers, and prevent further insult to injury.

